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ples, a Louisiana rescuer could double his chances of recovery by
basing his claim on both tort and quasi contract. Equity obliges
the beneficiary to indemnify his benefactor. Although the major-
ity of both common law and Louisiana cases have based recovery
under the rescue doctrine on tort principles, the doctrine of
quasi contract (restitution) could be applied in common law
jurisdictions and negotiorum gestio (the civilian quasi contrac-
tual doctrine) in Louisiana. The rescuer need not prove negli-
gence of the defendant under quasi contract or negotiorum gestio
as is presently necessary under the tort principles. The courts
have based the rescue doctrine on tort whether the rescuer has
sought recovery against the person rescued, or the negligent
third person who created the danger, or both of them. The
doctrine of quasi contract could be applied in the same cases
with the added advantage that the rescuer need only prove
unjust enrichment of the rescued person and/or third party.6
Edward A. Kaplan
FIXING LIMITS, AND SURVEYING LAND
The objective of this Comment is to relate the engineer's
role in surveying lands and fixing boundaries to the lawyer's
role in determining the legal rights of the parties resulting from
means of affording relief in all countries of the civil law in situations where
special rules of Equity and especially those relating to constructive trusts
would be invoked in Anglo-American law.
"There is a negotiorum gestio according to French law, if the following
conditions exist: (1) the intervention must not have proceeded from a
purely egotistical thought; (2) the intervention must not conflict with the
legitimate opposition of the principal; (3) the intervention must have been
useful to the principal. The courts no longer inquire into the intention of
the gestor, but into his act, which they appreciate in a spirit of liberality.
If the act is profitable to another, they presume that the gestor did not
intend to serve his own ends exclusively." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 207.
68. The basic reasons possibly why the courts have failed to utilize a
quasi contract remedy, despite its conceptual availabilty, have to do with
the reasons why in Louisiana the courts have generally characterized suits
for personal injuries as tort actions prescriptible within one year (See LA.
CIvIL CODE art. 3536 (1870), rather than contractual actions prescriptible in ten
years as personal actions (see Id. art. 3544), even in cases where the personal
injuries could have been described as resulting from breach of a contractual
obligation. These have been dictated by policy reasons underlying the
shorter prescriptive period for tort actions (medical examinations concur-
rent with injuries and others) than for contract actions. The ultimate answer
may be to have by statute a general prescriptive period applicable in any
event insofar as the claim seeks recovery for personal injury damages while
permitting conceptual characterization of actions as either tort, contract,
or quasi contract. This reasoning was suggested to the writer by Judge
Albert Tate, Jr., Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,
on leave of absence to serve as Professor of Law, Louisiana State Univer-
sity, 1967-68.
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such boundary-fixing. To provide their clients with adequate
service and protection, it is important that the lawyer and
engineer understand and coordinate their functions. Because
of the important role that land titles1 play in the boundary
action, a brief review of the origin of private titles and their
relation to surveying principles is in order.2
THE ORIGIN OF PRIVATE TITLES AND SURVEYING PRINCIPLES
The Louisiana Purchase vested title to all lands in the Lou-
isiana Territory in the United States which, pursuant to prin-
ciples of international law, in turn recognized private claims
under confirmed3 grants from prior sovereigns. 4 Title to the
land which the prior sovereigns had not transferred by private
grants vested in the United States' public domain.5
According to Louisiana Supreme Court decisions, the admis-
sion of Louisiana into the Union as a state in 1812 vested owner-
ship of the beds of all navigable waterways and tidal overflow
lands in the State of Louisiana by virtue of its inherent
sovereignty.6 Title to all other publicly owned land remained
in the United States subject to disposition by Congress.7
By various acts Congress transferred title to most of the land
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 845 (1870): "The limits must be fixed according to
the respective titles of the parties; In absence of title, on both sides, posses-
sion governs."
2. For a thorough discussion of the origin of private titles in Louisiana
see Comment, 27 TUL. L. REV. 59 (1952). For a discussion of surveying prin-
ciples see U.S. DEP'T OF TILE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, THE
MANUAL OF SURVEYING INSTRUCTIONS (1947).
3. City of New Orleans v. Joseph Rathborne Land Co., 209 La. 93, 24
So.2d 275 (1945). The object of federal confirmation acts was to ascertain
quantities of land granted and their description to determine what land
belonged to individuals and what belonged to the United States, and to con-
firm to grantees imperfect titles. See Act of March 2, 1849, 9 Stat. 352; Act
of February 6, 1835, 4 Stat. 749; Act of July 4, 1836, 6 Stat. 682; Act of April
12, 1814, ch. 52 "Act for Final Adjudication of Land Titles in Louisiana";
Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 92; Act of March 2, 1821, ch. 12. The acts supra are
no longer in effect and it would take an act of Congress to confirm a foreign
land grant today.
4. Concerning the international law rule, see 30 AM. JUr. International
Law § 46 (1940).
5. Board of Directors of New Orleans Land Co., 138 La. 32, 70 So. 27(1915); Nixon v. Houillon, 20 La. Ann. 515 (1868).
6. Board of Comm'rs v. Mt. Forest Fur Farms, 178 La. 696, 152 So. 497(1933); State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916); State v. Bayou
Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912). See also LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 453 (1870). For a discussion of the inherent sovereignty doctrine see
A. YIANNOPOULOs, LOUISIANA PRACTICE, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 31, 32 (1966).
7. The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate and dispose
of public land. United States v. Midwestern Oil, 236 U.S. 459 (1915). See also
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
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in Louisiana to the State of Louisiana or to private citizens.8
In 1807 a federal statute established a commission to investigate
claims to land through grants of prior sovereigns. 9 In 1841
Congress donated 500,000 acres of land to Louisiana to assist
the state in making internal improvements."0 Section sixteen of
each township was reserved by Congress at an early date for
educational use by the states to be formed out of the Louisiana
Purchase.1 To aid the states in the construction of levees and
dams, Congress granted them the swamp and overflowed lands
which had not been sold prior to September 28, 1950.12 Land was
also granted to the state or to railroad companies for construc-
tion of railroads in Louisiana. Congress also transferred a great
quantity of land to private individuals through homestead
entries 18 and sales of timber and stone land.14 Additionally,
Congress donated land to members of the armed forces, their
widows, or heirs as bounty for services in the War of 1812, the
Mexican War, and certain Indian Wars.' It should be noted
that issuance of a patent 6 accompanied by a federal survey is
required for the transfer of title from the United States to a
private claimant, 7 and with rare exception the issuance of a
patent is necessary for transfer of land from the United States
to the State of Louisiana.'
Once the states acquired title to lands they sometimes trans-
ferred title to private individuals through homestead entries 9
8. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1-25, 72-107, 161-302 (1946). The United States Land De-
partment which included a General Land Office and District Land Offices
was established and methods of disposal of public lands were prescribed and
regulated.
9. For a discussion of foreign grants and the Commission established
for confirmation, see McMicken v. United States, 97 U.S. 204 (1877).
10. 4 Stat. 453 (1841).
11. 2 Stat. 324 (1805), 2 Stat. 390 (1806), 2 Stat. 662 (1811); Louisiana v.
Joyce, 261 F. 128 (5th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 484 (1919).
12. 9 Stat. 519 (1850), 43 U.S.C. § 982 (1946). See 9 Stat. 352 (1849); Com-
ment, 23 TUL. L. REv. 504 (1949). The Act of March 2, 1849, applied exclusively
to Louisiana and was the first of the swamp grants enacted by Congress.
13. 43 U.S.C. § 161-302 (1946).
14. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 311, 313 (1946).
15. 43 U.S.C.A. § 791 (1946).
16. Patent information concerning approved township plats may be
found at the State Land Office. Complete information regarding Spanish
and French grants and acquisitions from the United States can be obtained
from either the Bureau of Public Land Management or the State Land
Office. Some patents will be found of record in the conveyance records.
17. Redfield v. Parks, 132 U.S. 239 (1889); Riggio v. McNeely, 135 La.
391, 65 So. 552 (1914).
18. On March 3, 1857, Congress passed full title to certain swamp lands
without issuance of patents.
19. LA. R.S. 41:501-594 (1950); La. Acts 1871, No. 21.
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or sales.- Another method was through transfers to levee boards
with subsequent sales to private individuals.21
It should be noted that the fountainhead of all private titles
is their severance from the federal government's public domain.
Without this severance possession for time immemorial will not
serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription against either the
federal or state government. By virtue of the supremacy clause
of the Federal Constitution 2 the rules promulgated by the Bu-
reau of Public Land Management2 3 pursuant to congressionally
delegated powers prime Louisiana legislation in determining
conflicts with regard to initial severance of public lands by
grants, patents, or other transactions.
A United States patent conveys title to a tract defined
in terms of monuments established by federal surveyors and
described in the official plat.24 The term "plat" as employed
technically refers to the drawing which represents the lines
surveyed, established, retraced, or resurveyed. It shows the direc-
tion and length of each of such lines, the relation to the adjoin-
ing official surveys, and the boundaries, description, and area
of each parcel of land. Ordinarily an original survey of public
lands does not ascertain boundaries; it creates them.25 Public
lands are not to be deemed surveyed or identified until the
survey is approved and the plat filed in the district land office by
direction of the Bureau of Land Management. 26 Also, no sub-
divisions are to be "disposed of" until so identified. 7
The legal significance of the plats and field notes is discussed
in Alaska United Gold Mining Co. v. Cincinnati Alaska Mining
20. Id., 41:541-52, 41:331, La. Acts 1902, No. 124 (Repealed 1960); id.
41:711, § 2958 (Rev. Stat. 1870), La. Acts 1855, No. 235; id. 41:801, La. Acts
1902, No. 217.
21. La. Acts 1879, No. 33; La. Acts 1890,- No. 97.
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2; Richard v. Poitevent & Favre Lumber Co.,
10 La. App. 608, 120 So. 235 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929). Patents from state
must yield to grants from United States as shown by United States survey
so far as limits of the tract are concerned.
23. Rev. Stat. § 453, 43 U.S.C. § 2 (1946): "The Director of the Bureau
of Land Management shall perform, under the direction of the Secretary
of the Interior, all executive duties appertaining to the surveying and sale
of the public lands of the United States, or in any wise respecting suchpublic lands; and, also such as relate to private claims of lands and the
issuing of patents for all grants of land under the authority of the Govern-
ment."
24. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, THE MANUAL
oF SURVEYnO INSTRUCTIONS (1947).
25. Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427 (1922).
26. United States v. Cowlinshaw, 202 F. 317 (1913).
27. United States v. Hurlburt, 72 F.2d 427, 428 (10th Cir. 1934).
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Co. 2 1 There the court observed that both federal and state courts
refer to plats and field notes referred to in patents to determine
the limits of the area that passed under such patents. In Cragin v.
PowellJ2 9 the United States Supreme Court said:
"It is a well settled principle that when lands are granted
according to an official survey of such lands the plat itself
with all its notes, lines, descriptions and landmarks be-
comes as much a part of the grant or deed by which they
were conveyed and control so far as limits are concerned,
as if such descriptive features were written out upon the
face of the deed or grant itself."
Because of the interrelationship between the disposition and
surveying and identification of federal public lands the United
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management,
periodically publishes a manual of instructions for the surveying
of the public lands of the United States,"0 as well as rules per-
taining to location of boundaries. The rules for United States
surveys provide that the public lands are to be divided by lines
running north and south according to the meridians and by
crossing them at right angles to form townships of six square
miles. These townships are further divided into thirty-six sec-
tions, each containing as nearly as possible six hundred and forty
acres.2 1 When this is impossible, irregular townships and sections
are created.
The boundaries and contents of the several sections, half
sections, and quarter sections are ascertained in conformity
with the principles recognized by the Bureau of Public Lands. 3
28. 45 L.D. 330, 336 (1916) (land office decisions).
29. 128 U.S. 691, 696 (1888).
30. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL OF
SURVEYING INSTRUCTIONS (1947). Earlier manuals were published and known
as the Manuals of 1855, 1881, 1890, 1894, 1902, and 1930.
31. The rules for United States surveys are found at Rev. Stat. § 2395;
March 3, 1925, 43 Stat. 1144, 43 U.S.C. 751 (1925).
32. Id.: "First. All the corners marked in the surveys returned by
Director shall be established as the proper corners of sections, or sub-
divisions of sections, which they were intended to designate, and the cor-
ners of half and quarter sections not marked on the surveys shall be placed
as nearly as possible equidistant from two corners which stand on the same
line.
"Second. The boundary lines actually run and marked in the surveys
returned by the Director shall be established as the proper boundary lines
of the sections or subdivisions for which they were intended, and the length
of such lines as returned shall be held and considered as the true length
thereof. And the boundary lines which have not been actually run and
marked shall be ascertained by running straight lines from the established
corners to the opposite corresponding corners; but in those portions of
1968]
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The Bureau of Land Management recognizes the following
rules pertaining to location of boundaries:
"First. That the boundaries and subdivisions of the
public lands as surveyed under approved instructions by
the duly appointed engineers, the physical evidence of which
survey consists of monuments established upon the ground,
and the record evidence of which consists of field notes and
plats duly approved by the authorities constituted by law,
are unchangeable after the passing of the title by the United
States.
"Second. That the physical evidence of the original town-
ship, section, quarter section, and other monuments must
stand as the true corners of the subdivisions which they were
intended to represent, and will be given controlling prefer-
ence over the recorded directions and lengths of lines.
"Third. That quarter-quarter-section corners not estab-
lished in the process of the original survey shall be placed
on the line connecting the section and quarter section cor-
ners, and midway between them, except on the last half
mile of section lines closing on the north and west bound-
aries of the township, or on other lines between fractional
or irregular sections.
"Fourth. That the center lines of regular sections are to
be straight, running from the quarter-section corner on one
boundary of the section to the corresponding corner on the
opposite section line.
"Fifth. That in a fractional section where no opposite
corresponding quarter-section corner has been or can be
established, the center line of such section must be run
from the proper quarter-section corner as nearly in a cardinal
direction to the meander line, reservation, or other boundary
the fractional townships, where no such opposite corresponding corners have
been or can be fixed, the boundary lines shall be ascertained by running
from the established corners due north and south or east and west lines as
the case may be to the water course, Indian boundary line or other external
boundary of such fractional township.
"Third. Each section or subdivision of section, the contents whereof
have been returned by the Director shall be held and considered as con-
taining the exact quantity expressed in such return; and the half sections
and quarter sections, the contents whereof shall not have been thus returned,
shall be held and considered as containing the one-half or the one-fourth
part, respectively, of the returned contents of the section of which they
make part."
[Vol. XXVIII
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of such fractional section, as due parallelism with section
lines will permit.
"Sixth. That lost or obliterated corners of the approved
surveys must be restored to their original locations when-
ever it is possible to do so. Actions or decisions by surveyors,
Federal, State or local, which may involve the possibility
of changes in the established boundaries of patented lands,
are subject to review by the State courts upon suit advancing
that issue. ' 33
In addition to the rules of federal surveys and the rules of
the Bureau of Land Management, guides for determining bound-
aries or location of lines can be found in the jurisprudence,
which ranks the evidence presented in order of their importance
as: (a) natural monuments, (b) artificial monuments, (c) dis-
tances, (d) courses, and (e) quantity.24 In Barrataria Land Co. v.
Louisiana Meadows3 5 the court, in a boundary action between
litigants claiming under government titles and surveys, held that
parties are entitled to have the lines re-established as originally
located by the government surveyor, but where there are no
lines or established corners to be found, and certain natural
objects referred to in the field notes of the surveyor are admit-
tedly misplaced, the court must decide whether the original
boundary is to be re-established with reference to the erroneous
location of such objects or with reference to the field notes not
shown to be otherwise erroneous.
Other jurisprudential guidelines involving ranking of evi-
dence were stated in Louisiana Central Lumber Co. v. Stephen-
son:836 (1) lines marked on the ground control in case of dis-
crepancy between them and those called for in maps, plats, or
field notes; (2) a plat drawn from field notes gives way to the
latter in case of discrepancy as to best evidence of the actual
original survey; and (3) government plats made from erroneous
surveys or from no surveys may be shown to be erroneous in
the location of water courses. In the landmark case of Cragin v.
Powell 3 the United States Supreme Court recognized error in
33. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL OF
SURVEYING INSTRUCTIONS 10 (1947).
34. City of New Orleans v. Joseph Rathborne Land Co., 209 La. 93, 24
So.2d 275 (1945).
35. 146 La. 999, 84 So. 334 (1920).
36. 13 La. App. 671, 128 So. 696 (2d Cir. 1930).
37. Cragin v. Powell, 128 U.S. 691 (1888). The power to make and correct
surveys of public lands belongs to the political department of the govern-
ment and subject to the supervision of the General Land Office, yet the
19681
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the original government survey but held the re-survey as always
subject to rights of a purchaser under the original survey. In
Union Production v. Placid Oil38 two oil companies had separate
leases covering the same acreage because the official surveys
of two adjoining townships overlapped. The Louisiana appellate
court held that the party who acquired rights in the township
first surveyed primed the party who acquired rights under the
later survey of the adjoining township because the second sur-
veyor had no contractual authority to enter the township first
surveyed.
Conflicts arising after initial severance from the public
domain of the federal government are resolved by Louisiana
legislation and jurisprudence. The remainder of this Comment
is focused on the settlement of these conflicts.
FIXING LIMITS
Fixing with a Survey
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that land may be sepa-
rated judicially or extra-judicially by mutual consent if the
parties are of full age; but if one of the parties is a minor, or
interdict, it must be done judicially. 9 The Code also provides
that in either case the separation must be made by a sworn
surveyor of this state, who is bound to make a procs verbal of
his work in the presence of two witnesses.40 It is the theory and
policy of the law that the survey by a sworn surveyor is an
official act and the proc~s verbal is written evidence of the proper
location of land in accordance with the title papers of the parties,
and thus is sufficient to transfer the ownership of property or
serve as the basis for ten-year acquisitive prescription. 41
The courts have been hypertechnical in the past in requiring
compliance with the letter of the law when boundaries are
courts have power to protect the rights of a party who has purchased
lands in good faith from the government against interference of resurveys
made by the Land Department subsequent to such purchase.
38. 178 So.2d 392 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
39. LA. CIVL CODE art. 832 (1870); 2 TOULLIER, DRorr CIviL nO 172, at 48
(1833).
40. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 833 (1870): "Whether the limits be fixed judicially
or extra judically, It must be done by a sworn surveyor of this State,
who shall be bound to make a proces verbal of his work in the presence
of two witnesses, called for the purpose, who shall sign the proces verbal
with him, or mention shall be made therein of the causes which prevented
them from signing."
41. Williams v. Bernstein, 51 La. Ann. 115, 119, 25 So. 411, 415 (1899).
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physically fixed by a surveyor. In Talbot v. Pittman42 the trial
court's judgment was set aside because of the surveyor's failure
to give the notice required under article 834. In Randazzo v.
Lucas43 the court-appointed surveyor's work was defective be-
cause only one witness was present at the survey; therefore,
the court ordered a resurvey. In Pan American Prod. v. Robi-
chaux4 4 the co-owners of a tract of land hired a surveyor to par-
tition land. During the survey each party was present but the
surveyor made a mistake of some 470 feet. Ten years later the
defendant, in an action to correct the erroneous survey, pleaded
ten-year prescription under article 853. The court denied the plea
of prescription because the surveyor made no proc~s verbal as
required by article 833. The defendant then contended that even
if there was no formal survey, the plaintiff was bound by his
good faith consent to the fixing by their surveyor. The court
rejected the defendant's plea, basing its decision on mutual error
as to the principal cause of the contract, and allowed relocation
of the boundary. Hence, if the formalities of the Code dealing
with fixing of limits are not strictly followed, the fixing will
be ineffective and either party may later demand a redeter-
mination. Also, if the formalities have been followed and the
surveyor makes an error, the error can always be corrected,
unless one of the parties has ultimately acquired the disputed
area by acquisitive prescription.
Fixing with No Survey
The Civil Code does not include as a method of fixing bound-
aries mutual consent of the parties without the use of a formal
survey. However, the parties may achieve the same result by
actual sale of immovable property unaccompanied by a survey.
In this case the stability of land ownership is protected by the
formal requirements of such a sale. Article 2440 requires that
all sales of immovable property be made by authentic act or
under private signature. The minimum requirements of a sale
of immovable property are outlined in article 2275; namely,
if a verbal sale is made it is good against the vendor, as well
as against the vendee, who confesses it when interrogated on
oath, if delivery has been made of the immovable property
thus sold.
42. 114 So.2d 117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
43. 92 So.2d 398 (Or. App. 1957); LA. CVIL CODE art. 833 (1870).
44. 200 La. 666, 8 So.2d 635 (1942).
1968]
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The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Opdenwyer v. Brown,45
cited a line of cases for the proposition that the parties may
mutually fix their bounds without a formal survey and without
the protection accompanying a sale of immovable property. A
careful reading of the cited cases shows that an actual physical
separation on the ground was not involved. Rather the issue
was what property was transferred in the acts of sale. In Gaude v.
Williams 46 the court held that owners are not bound by a mere
consent regarding boundaries fixed by themselves in error
without consulting experts. A mutual fence for fifteen years was
held insufficient to bar a redetermination in this case. It should
be noted that although the parties by convention may transfer
immovable property, which transfer has the effect of creating
new boundaries, this type of fixing is a paper transaction and
not a physical separation and marking of the limits in the field.
In Harper v. Learned47 the Supreme Court held that it was not
against public policy for the parties to fix their boundaries
without a survey, if it was in writing. In the Harper case there
was only a verbal agreement, but the court relied upon equitable
estoppel48 to prevent the plaintiff from bringing the boundary
action because the verbal agreement was mentioned in numerous
recorded instruments by both parties subsequent to the agree-
ment. A recent line of cases holds that a party may be deemed
to have physically fixed the boundary where he and his neighbor
informally agree to a visible boundary verbally or actively
acquiesce in its location.4"
45. The Supreme Court in Opdenwyer v. Brown, 155 La. 617, 99 So. 482
(1924), cited the following for the proposition that the parties may fix the
bounds mutually without a survey: "Buisson v. Grant, 4 Rob. 360; Blanc v.
Duplessi, 13 La. 334; Keller v. Shelmire, 42 La. Ann. 323; Lemoin v. Monclar,
9 La. Ann. 515; Riddell v. Jackson, 14 La. Ann. 135; Lyons v. Dobbins, 26
La. Ann. 580 (1874)."
46. 47 La. Ann. 1325 (1895). See also Pan American Prod. Co. v. Robi-
chaux, 200 La. 666, 8 So.2d 635 (1942). But of. Blanchard v. Monrose, 12 La.
App. 503, 125 So. 891 (Orl. Cir. 1930); Carr v. Geoghegan, 11 La. App. 74,
123 So. 371 (Orl. Cir. 1929). The Blanchard and Carr cases stand for the
proposition that the ten-year acquisitive prescription of article 853 may bar
the boundary action where the parties without a survey, merely acquiesce in
a boundary. However, the court did not allow the prescription to work in
favor of the defendant in either case indicating an extremely rigid test
will be applied before concluding the parties acquiesced in the boundary.
The Third Circuit felt the requirements had been met in LaCalle v. Chap-
man, 174 So.2d 668 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
47. Harper v. Learned, 199 La. 398, 6 So.2d 326 (1942). But cf. Griffin v.
Mahoney, 56 So.2d 208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
48. See also Kreider v. Kraak, 3 La. App. 442 (Orl. Cir. 1925), for equi-
table estoppel as defense to boundary action.
49. La Calle v. Chapman, 174 So.2d 668 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). In
La Cafle the court admitted the holding conflicted with Duplantis v. Cehan,
140 So.2d 409 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Roberts v. Dutton, 130 So.2d 428
[Vol. XXVIII
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It would seem that if the parties fix their boundaries with-
out a survey for this fixing to amount to a transfer of immov-
able property, the minimum formal requirements of a sale of
immovable property should be met.50 When the parties fixing
their bounds without a survey commit an error of fact, the
ten-year acquisitive prescription of article 853 should not bar a
redetermination of boundaries, unless one of the parties can
produce a title or proc~s verbal in lieu of title (when a formal
survey is made) upon which to base his ten-year acquisitive
prescription. In Gray v. Couvillon5' the parties attempted phys-
ically to fix their boundaries extra-judicially but the survey
was ineffective because the formalities of article 833 were not
followed; therefore, the court found that the ten-year acquisitive
prescription of article 853 was not applicable.
It is suggested that a fixing of boundaries without a formal
survey accompanied by an actual transfer of land should under
no circumstances be valid against third party good faith pur-
chasers unless such agreement is recorded in the conveyance
records of the parish in which the land is located.52
Fixing Boundaries When the State of Louisiana Is a Party
The Louisiana legislature, subsequent to the adoption of
the Revised Civil Code of 1870, outlined a special procedure to
be followed in fixing boundaries between lands belonging to
the State of Louisiana and contiguous lands belonging to another
person. 53
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Scott v. Blanton, 115 So.2d 658 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1959), but stated that the obiter dictum of Sessum v. Hemperley, 233 La.
444, 96 So.2d 832 (1957), was more persuasive than the cited cases. This
case was criticized in Note, 40 TUL. L. REV. 644 (1966). It is submitted that
the language relied upon in Sessum does not have the status of obiter dictum
because it was written in the first hearing and never mentioned in the final
hearing.
50. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2275 (1870): Every transfer of immovable property
must be in writing; but if a verbal sale, or other disposition of such property
be made, it shall be good against the vendor, as well as against the vendee,
who confesses it when interrogated on oath, provided actual delivery has
been made of the immovable property thus sold. See also id. arts. 2242, 2266.
51. 12 La. Ann. 730, 732 (1857): "Parties are not bound by a consent to
boundaries which have been fixed under an evident error as to the correct
location of their titles, unless, perhaps by the prescription of thirty years."
52. LA. CIVIL COD art. 2266 (1870); McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51
So. 100 (1909).
53. LA. R.S. 41:1131-1136 (1950).
198
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES
Under the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure the possessory, peti-
tory, and boundary actions are available to determine ques-
tions concerning the right to possession or ownership of land.
These actions are not new and deal with related subject matter.
Despite the relationship, the jurisprudence at an early date
concluded that questions of validity of titles could not be deter-
mined in a boundary action, but rather must be brought in a
separate petitory action. The new Code of Civil Procedure legis-
latively overruled this line of cases and permits the court to
determine questions of title and ownership in an action of
boundary.5 4 The more basic question of whether the substan-
tive rules of the boundary action should be used to determine
questions of title and ownership in the petitory action in general
remains in spite of adoption of the new Code of Civil Proce-
dure. In Sattler v. Pellichino,55 the First Circuit, even before the
new Code of Civil Procedure, relied upon a law review article5 6
to support its opinion allowing article 852, dealing with the
boundary action, to be pleaded as a defense in a petitory action.
It is submitted that this conclusion is correct and the substan-
tive rules of the boundary action could be of great value in
determining questions of validity of titles or ownership of im-
movables in a petitory action.
Elements of the Boundary Action
The purpose of the boundary action is to separate physically
one parcel of land from another and to mark limits by visible
bounds.57 The boundary action, like that of partition, is by its
nature imprescriptible;58 however, the action may be without
object in cases in which a party acquires the land in dispute by
the effect of acquisitive prescription. The action is therefore fruit-
ful where the boundaries have never been fixed or where the
tracts have once been separated but the physical bounds are no
longer visible,59 or where the bounds have been fixed incor-
rectly.6 0 The parties to the boundary action include the owner
54. LA. CODE! Civ. P. art. 3693 (1960).
55. Sattler v. Pellichino, 71 So.2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
56. Chaney, Prescription under Article 852, 13 LA. L. REV. 585 (1953).
57. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 826 (1870); Sessum v. Hemperley, 233 La. 444, 96
So.2d 832 (1957); Talbot v. Pittman, 114 So.2d 117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
58. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 825 (1870).
59. Id. art. 823; Opdenwyer v. Brown, 155 La. 617, 99 So. 482 (1924).
60. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 853 (1870); Opdenwyer v. Brown, 155 La. 617, 99
So. 482 (1924).
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of the land involved, one who possesses as owner, or one vested
with a real right in an immovable.61 The forum of the boundary
action is the court which has jurisdiction over the land involved.62
Determination According to Titles, Where Both
Parties Have Titles
The basic rule of the Civil Code on fixing limits in the
boundary action is that reference must be made to the ancient
titles of the parties, and the limits must be fixed in accordance
with the titles unless it be proved that the bounds have been
since changed or that the land has been increased or diminished
by changes caused by succession, by the will of the owner, or
other events.63 The purpose of referring to the titles in order to
fix limits is obviously to determine who owns what quantity of
land by the use of the best evidence available-the titles of the
parties.
Prior to the passage of the new Code of Civil Procedure, the
jurisprudence was to the effect that "titles of the parties" merely
referred to the titles under which the parties held their claim
to ownership. The question of validity of title was never at issue
because the courts held that the issue must be tried in a petitory
action. The new Code of Civil Procedure, however, expressly
provides that the issue of validity of titles may be determined
in a boundary action, therefore, the rule providing for the fixing
of limits according to the titles of the parties takes on new
significance. Now, when both parties have titles, and only one
is held valid against the world, this title must surely prime the
title not good against the world. This leaves the rules pertaining
to the fixing of boundaries where both parties present titles
applicable to the situation where both parties have titles good
against the world, or where neither is good against the world.
The following are guides to the interpretation of the titles pre-
sented:
(A) A Common Author in Title Exists
When the owner of two estates alienates one of them and
describes the estate transferred by metes and bounds,6 4 and the
61. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 829, 830, 831 (1870); Landry v. Poirrier, 12 Orl.
App. 232 (La. App. 1915). See also Sprigg v. Hooper, 9 Rob. 248 (1884).
62. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 840 (1870).
63. Id. arts. 843, 845.
64. "Metes and bounds" means boundary lines of land with their terminal
points and angles.
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ownership of any part is contested, the limits assigned to it by
the vendor at the time of the sale must be consulted. 5
When the parties claim under primitive concessions (land
grants of the federal, state or foreign governments) or prove
their dates and contents in case their concessions should be lost,
if there be less land than is called for in the different titles, he
who has the oldest concession takes the quantity of land men-
tioned, the other parties having a right only to the remainder. 6
If the parties or those from whom they have acquired
present titles having a common author, the preference is given
to him whose title is of the most ancient date. 7
(B) No Common Author in Title
If the parties or those from whom they acquired hold titles
from different proprietors, the priority of date is immaterial"
and one of the following three rules must be followed:
(1) If the titles exhibited by one of the parties fix the
extent of land which he ought to have and those exhibited
by the other make no mention of the extent, the first takes
the quantity mentioned in his title and the second takes
only the excess; unless the latter establishes by legal proof
or by past possession that quantity of land to which he is
entitled. 9
(2) If the titles exhibited fail to mention the quantity
of land which each person ought to have, and the quantity
can not be established in a legal manner, the limits must
be fixed so as to divide the land equally between them.70
(3) If the titles exhibited call for a greater or lesser ex-
tent of land than the land which is to be bounded contains,
65. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 844 (1870); Lemoin v. Moncla, 9 La. Ann. 515
(1854): " '[I1n action of bornage, a dividing line long established between the
parties, and referred to in the proces verbal of sale of the plantation to the
plaintiff, will be taken as the true one, in preference to running a new line
more in accordance with the calls and distances, and which gives plaintiff
a larger boundary.' " Nattin v. Glassell, 156 La. 423, 426, 100 So. 609, 609-10
(1924): "The polar star in all controversies of this kind [arising out of
descriptions in deeds] should be, if it can be seen, the intention of the
parties."
66. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 846 (1870). The courts are bound to consider treaties
in determining the validity of a French or Spanish land grant as against
a grant of same lands by the United States. See Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 511 (1838).
67. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 847 (1870).
68. Id. art. 848.
69. Id. art. 849.
70. Id. art. 850.
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the limits must be fixed so as to provide proportionally
among the interested parties the resulting profit or loss.7'
It is understood that the rules prescribed in the preceding
articles only take effect in the absence of possession by one or
more of the parties, sufficient to establish prescription.
Article 848 and the preceding rules72 pertaining to the sit-
uation where parties hold titles from different authors may have
been of considerable use in France and countries where the
chain of titles might go back many hundreds of years and in
countries where public records were not adequately kept. How-
ever, in Louisiana, where titles and confirmations of grants date
back only as far as the Louisiana Purchase, the article's useful-
ness is limited to those cases where adjoining land possessors
each have a title which is not good against the world. In this
case the parties having their limits fixed are not interested in a
determination of ownership, but only wish to have the limits
described in their titles marked.
A question of more immediate importance is whether the
guides provided for settling disputes where there is no common
author in title should also be used where there is a common
author in title. In Waguespack v. Lower Lafourche Planting &
Mfg. Co.73 the State of Louisiana was the common author in
title, yet the court applied the proportioning provision of article
851, a provision applicable to situations where there is no com-
mon author in title. It is submitted that the results are correct
because the source of the provision regulating the situation
where there is no author in title was the writings of the French
jurist, Toullier,74 who did not discuss the dichotomy between the
situation where there is a common author in title and where
there is none, but simply applied the provisions to each case
indiscriminately.
Where Only One or No Parties Have Title
Where only one or none of the parties to a boundary action
present titles, the French writers favored resolving the dispute
71. Id. art. 851.
72. Article 848 contemplates the use of articles 849, 850, and 851 in situa-
tions where the parties each have a title, but from different authors in title.
73. Waguespack v. Lower Lafourche Planting & Mfg. Co., 160 La. 1046,
107 So. 901 (1926).
74. 2 TouLLraR, DROIT CWLn o 175 (1833).
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according to the rules of possession.7 5 The redactors of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code, however, never accepted this principle and
provided that possession is determinitive only where neither
party has a title.76 Thus, where only one party has a title, his
title will be determinative.
Determination According to Prescription
(1) Article 852 (Acquisitive)
The Civil Code provides that the foregoing substantive rules
on the boundary action shall be primed by the prescription of
thirty years.77 An interesting jurisprudential disagreement has
been brewing over the past fifty years as to whether the thirty-
year prescriptive period mentioned in article 852 is a mere ref-
erence to the thirty-year prescription articles of the Civil Code
under Title XXIII, Of Occupancy, Possession and Prescription,
or a separate thirty-year acquisitive prescription article par-
ticular to the boundary action.
From the comments of the redactors on the boundary arti-
cles, we see that the French jurist, Toullier, was relied upon
heavily.78 It is almost certain that Toullier's writings were
the source of the portion of our article 852, which deals with the
thirty-year acquisitive prescription. From his writings it is cer-
75. Id. no 176: "If there are no titles from one or the other or from
both then the sole possession must make the law." (transl. by Yves Verret.)
76. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 845 (1870): "The limits must be fixed according
to the respective titles of the parties; in the absence of title, on both sides,
possession governs."
77. Id. art. 852: "Whether the titles, exhibited by the parties, whose
lands are to be limited, consist of primitive concessions or other acts by
which property may be transferred, if it be proved that the person whose
title is of the latest date, or those under whom he holds, have enjoyed, in
good or bad faith, uninterrupted possession during thirty years, of any
quantity of land beyond that mentioned in his title, he will be permitted to
retain it, and his neighbor, though he have a more ancient title, will only
have a right to the excess; for if one can not prescribe against his own
title, he can prescribe beyond his title or for more than it calls for, pro-
vided it be by thirty years possession."
78. Concordance -Table
LA. CIVIL CODE (1870) 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL (1833)
art. no.
823 169
824 170
825 170
826 171
829 181
830 181
831 181
839 173
840 173
COMMENTS
tain that the thirty-year prescription contemplated by him in
the boundary action was a mere reference to the thirty-year
prescription following the Civil Code.79 The determination of
whether article 852 is a separate prescription article or a refer-
ence to the thirty-year prescription of the Civil Code is relevant
because of the established line of jurisprudence surrounding the
thirty-year acquisitive prescription of the Civil Code pertaining
to such things as the requirement of a juridical link to tack on
the possession of one's ancestor in title, 0 and the procedure for
interrupting prescription.8 '
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Opdenwyer v. Brown,8 2
expressly overruled Vicksburg Southern & Pacific Ry. v. Le
Rosens 3 and held that, "either article 852 (1870) is inaccurate
in its terms and means the same as article 3493 et seq. or
that the article was actually intended to mean something dif-
ferent." The court chose the latter alternative8 4 and proceeded
to draw a distinction between the tacking of possession require-
ments of article 3493 and following as interpreted by the juris-
prudence and those of article 852. The court held that if there
exists a visible boundary between the two estates and the tract
in dispute has been possessed under visible bounds for thirty
years, such visible bounds should prevail over the ideal bounds
called for in the titles. This case is often cited for the proposi-
tion that under article 852 a possessor under visible bounds may
tack onto his possession that of his author in title without the
requirement of a juridical link. This decision appears unfor-
tunate because the wrong alternative was chosen and under the
facts of this case there was a juridical link and the court could
have arrived at the same conclusion while following the prior
jurisprudence. As the court pointed out, "according to titles,
79. See 2 TOULLIER, DROIT civIL no 175 (1833) (the source, in part, of
article 852, which supports the proposition that article 852 is a mere refer-
ence to the thirty-year acquisitive prescription of the Code): "Thus the
respective titles make the rule, unless . . . by the trenetenarian possession
of land for 30 years following the Civil Code, one of the neighbors may have
prescribed beyond his title; for If one cannot prescribe against his title,
one can prescribe over and beyond his title .... "
80. For a thorough discussion of tacking of successive possessions for
acquisitive prescription in Louisiana, see Comment, 8 LA. L. REv. 105 (1949).
81. Blades v. Zinsel, 130 So. 139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930). The court
allowed interruption of prescription under Civil Code article 3520 by acknowl-
edgment.
82. 155 La. 617, 99 So. 482 (1924).
83. 52 La. Ann. 192, 26 So. 854 (1899).
84. This choice was questioned in Barlow, Boundary Problems in Lou-
isiana Land Title Examinations, in 10 MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 3, 26 (1963);
and in Rubin & Sachse, Boundaries, 23 LA. L. REv. 257, 260 (1963).
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defendant owns only the north half of the northeast quarter of
section 35 for this reason: That his vendor owned no more,
having purchased by that description. But it will be observed
that defendant himself did not purchase by that description."
It was intended that the defendant's title describe the property
up to the visible boundary and therefore there was a juridical
link.8 1
In Sessum v. HemperleyO the court again encountered dif-
ficulty in applying article 852 as evidenced by the fact that the
case was heard twice by the court of appeal and twice by the
Supreme Court with lengthy decisions each time. The Supreme
Court finally held that where visible boundaries separate two
tracts for more than thirty years these boundaries will prevail
over actual boundaries regardless of whether the visible bound-
aries were mutually consented to by the parties-an extension
of the Opdenwyer doctrine. Sessum has been relied upon to per-
petuate the jurisprudential departures instituted by Opdenwyer.
In Motty v. Broussard87 the parties owned lands suited to
cattle grazing. In 1920 plaintiff's ancestor in title built a fence
upon the high ground of his property. This fence was as much
as three hundred feet from the actual property line at one point,
and, according to the plaintiff, it was never intended to be on
the boundary of his land but merely to keep his pigs from stray-
ing too far north. In 1934 the fence fell into disrepair and the
plaintiff's and defendant's cattle crossed freely onto each others
lands and upon the disputed area. In 1945 the defendant rebuilt
the fence in the same place the old fence once stood. The plain-
tiff admitted that the defendant's action in 1945 should be con-
sidered as an act of adverse corporeal possession sufficient to
start the thirty-year prescription running. The court of appeal,
however, found that the original fence built in 1920 constituted
a visible bound, the sine qua non of article 852, and that since
vestiges of the fence remained, though in disrepair, from 1934
to 1945, such vestiges constituted a continuation of the defen-
dant's adverse possession despite the fact that the plaintiff's
cattle also grazed on the disputed land. The defendant's plea of
thirty-year acquisitive prescription was sustained to defeat plain-
tiff's boundary action.
85. See dissent in DeBakey v. Prater, 147 So. 734, 737 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1933).
86. 233 La. 444, 96 So.2d 832 (1957).
87. 201 So.2d 293 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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In Ponder v. Fussell88 the defendant in a petitory action had
purchased a house in 1950, which according to the titles of the
parties, encroached four feet upon the plaintiff's property. The
issue involved was whether defendant could tack the possession
of his ancestor in title despite the fact that he purchased accord-
ing to the ideal bounds, and had no juridical link. The court
held that the house itself constituted a visible boundary and
since the house was over thirty years old, the defendant's plea
of thirty-year acquisitive prescription under article 852 defeated
the boundary action without the necessity of a juridical link for
tacking.8 9
Perhaps article 852 was extended further in DeBakey v.
Prater90 than in any other case. In DeBakey the court allowed
the defendant to tack the possession of his ancestor in title with-
out a juridical link and also refused plaintiff's plea of interrup-
tion of acquisitive prescription by defendant's verbal acknowl-
edgment before the thirty years accrued.91
(2) Article 853
If the boundaries have been erroneously fixed through the
judicial method the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the
judgment is res judicata and may only be attacked within one
year for causes of fraud.92 If the boundary has been fixed extra-
judicially and the surveyor has made an error, the injured party
may have the error corrected subject to the defense of ten
years acquisitive prescription. It should be noted that article
853 is not a liberative prescription article and the party in whose
favor the error was committed must prove all of the elements
of ten-year acquisitive prescription except title translative of
ownership, because the formal survey stands as a substitute for
title.9 4
Upon the first hearing of the Sessum9 5 case, however, the Su-
88. 180 So.2d 413 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
89. Accord, Stanford v. Robertson, 144 So.2d 747 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
90. 147 So. 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
91. See note for jurisprudence to the contrary under LA. CIVIL CODE art.
3520 (1870).
92. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2004 (1960).
93. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 853 (1870): "If the boundaries have been fixed
according to a common title or according to different titles, and the surveyor
had committed an error in his measure, it can always be rectified, unless
the part of the land on which the error was committed, be acquired by an
adverse possession of ten years, if the parties are present, and twenty years,
if absent."
94. Williams v. Bernstein, 51 La. Ann. 115, 25 So. 411 (1899).
95. 233 La. 444, 96 So.2d 832 (1957).
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preme Court held that where there exists actual, visible bounds
which have been placed incorrectly extra-judicially, or fixed by
the consent or active acquiescence of the adjacent land owners,
an action in either case to rectify an alleged error in the loca-
tion of the boundary line must be instituted within ten years or
it will prescribe under article 853. This loose language has
caused subsequent courts to fall into error in two respects. First,
the language indicates that the ten-year prescriptive period of
article 853 is a liberative prescription. This is, of course, impos-
sible because if the plaintiff loses his right to bring the action
to correct incorrectly fixed boundaries, he would, in effect, lose
the ownership while the defendant may not have acquired the
ownership because he failed to meet some of the requirements
of ten-year acquisitive prescription. This would leave the land
in question in limbo with no owner. Secondly, the indication
that boundaries may be physically marked by the mere consent
or active acquiescence of adjacent landowners conflicts with
article 83398 which requires a formal survey by experts for
judicial or extra-judicial fixing. Also, the prohibition of article
8387 would strike with nullity any fixing of boundaries accom-
plished with the mere active acquiescence of the adjacent land-
owner because of the lack of the formal notice contemplated by
the article.
In Barker v. Houssiere Latreille Oil Co.98 the Supreme Court,
prior to the Sessum decision, held that the defendant could not
rely upon the ten-year prescription of article 853 to defeat the
boundary action where he erroneously built a multi-story build-
ing eighteen inches upon the plaintiff's land more than ten years
before the action was brought because the plaintiff did not
actively acquiesce in the defendant's action. In Frederick v. Bru-
land,99 an early Supreme Court case, the court said that where
96. LA. Civil COD, art. 833 (1870): "Whether the limits be fixed judicially
or extra judicially, it must be done by a sworn surveyor of this State, who
shall be bound to make a proces verbal of his work in the presence of two
witnesses, called for the purpose, who shall sign the proces verbal with him,
or mention shall be made therein of the causes which prevented them
from signing."
97. Id, art. 838: "It is forbidden to every owner of lands to fix the
limits between him and his adjoining neighbors, without giving them notice
to be present; and, without this formality, every such proceeding is null
and will produce no effect against his neighbors, who, besides, have their
action for damages against him, if they have suffered any injury thereby."
98. 160 La. 52, 106 So. 672 (1925).
99. Frederick v. Brulard, 6 La. Ann. 382 (1851). But cf. Morris v.
Prutsman, 7 La. App. 404 (1st Cir. 1928). The court held the building of
a fence dividing the alley way was a fixing of boundary by consent and a
plea of prescription of 10 years was properly maintained.
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the parties mutually fixed their boundaries without a formal
survey, article 853 could not be used to defeat the boundary
action because a mistake in running a division fence neither con-
ferred nor destroyed title and could not serve as a basis for ten-
year acquisitive prescription.
(3) Estoppel
Difficulty in determining the rights of the parties is also
encountered where it can be shown that one or both of the
parties never intended to purchase the land described in his
title. In Selfe v. Travis0 0 brothers with adjoining estates mis-
takenly built houses on one brother's estate. To correct the sit-
uation they had an unrecorded, informal survey made which
projected a skew line between the two houses thus reforming
the boundary lines called for in their deeds. The brothers subse-
quently each agreed to sell the tracts to plaintiff and defendant
according to the informal survey. In the proc~s verbal of the
sales, however, the estates were described without reference to
the new division. The court held the plaintiff was estopped from
bringing the boundary action and the deeds were reformed.
CONCLUSION
To determine the location of boundaries between two tracts
it is important first to see that the land involved has been
severed from the public domain. Secondly, the rules of surveying
must be applied to identify the land conveyed in each pertinent
transaction.
In Louisiana parties may have their limits determined judi-
cially or extra-judicially, but the actual marking on the ground
must be done by a sworn surveyor to produce any legal effects,
other than prescriptive. The vehicle by which parties have their
limits determined is the boundary action. The basic premise of
the boundary action is that the limits must be fixed in accordance
with the titles of the parties. Under the new Code of Civil Pro-
cedure questions of validity of title, formerly only justiciable
in a petitory action, may be determined in a boundary action.
Although the boundary action is, as a general rule, imprescripti-
ble article 853 provides that if the boundary has been fixed with
the use of a formal survey, and an error was committed, the
party in whose favor the error operated may utilize the survey
100. 29 So.2d 786 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
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and proces verbal as a basis for ten-year acquisitive prescription.
Also, article 852 provides that the rules under the section on
fixing limits will be primed by the thirty-year acquisitive pre-
scription article of the Civil Code. The courts now use article
852 as a means of avoiding the former jurisprudence and have
said that article 852 applies to the situation where visible bounds
have existed for over thirty years. In such cases the requirement
of a juridical link to tack successive possessions is abandoned.
Modern courts, under the reasoning that men earn their
livelihood in the field, not in the courthouse, have eased the
former, rigid requirements of acquisitive prescription. This is
evidenced by abandonment of the requirement of juridical link
if a visible bound exists for thirty years. Also, as regards bound-
aries not designated by visible markings, the court in Noel v.
Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co.,10 ' without expressly repeal-
ing the juridical link requirement, allowed the defendant to
tack possession without a link on the theory that it was the
intention of the vendor to transfer all he possessed. Noel seems
to foretell the death of the juridical link doctrine in Louisiana.
Carl E. Heck
101. 245 La. 324, 158 So.2d 179 (1963). Noel is criticized in Note 24 LA. L.
REV. 889 (1964); Dainow, Prescription, 25 LA. L. REV. 352 (1965) ("a tear in
the fabric of the law"); Note, 38 TUL. L. REv. 576 (1964).
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